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Small businesses are considered important engines for job growth and economic
development by policy makers worldwide. One of the most commonly cited constraints
of small businesses is a lack of access to capital. To address this constraint, small
business loan guarantee programs have been established in over 100 countries. There are
a variety of types of guarantee funds, with the most significant differences being which
borrowers are eligible for guarantees, and how borrowers are approved for guarantees.
There is currently no clear delineation between types of programs and the economic
conditions they operate in, though some trends are becoming apparent. However, these
trends may not be leading to the best economic outcomes possible. By better matching
the structure of the guarantee fund to the economic conditions it operates in, the
program‘s success in meeting economic development goals may be greatly improved.
Many programs in developing countries may not be taking advantage of bank expertise
and may be limiting the scope of their effectiveness. At the same time, programs in
developed countries may be wasting resources by scattering their efforts too thinly and
subsidizing less competitive firms to the detriment of local economic development.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic development efforts come in many forms, but almost all such programs share
the common goals of increasing economic activity and promoting employment growth.
Economic development programs that target small businesses and entrepreneurs are
extremely common in both the United States and internationally. While the number of
small businesses worldwide is enormous, their fragmentation and small individual sizes
leaves each very vulnerable to market forces beyond their control. However, because
small businesses, as a group, are recognized by governments worldwide as powerful
economic forces and major engines of job creation, these governments seek to address
constraints that small businesses face. Loan guarantee funds targeted at small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is one such program, and is meant to address SME‘s
difficulties in obtaining bank loans. The definition of an SME varies by country, with
some basing status on solely on the number of employees or total revenue, while others
have different thresholds for employment or revenue depending on the industry.
Therefore the statistics and research regarding SME‘s may not be consistent. However,
the most common trait for inclusion in this group is having fewer than 500 employees,
and, unless otherwise noted, that will be considered the standard for this paper.

While loan guarantee funds are common worldwide, they vary greatly in their structure
and operation. Furthermore, efforts to accurately measure their impact, and thus better
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implement the most effective forms, have been sparse. The purpose of this research is to
better understand guarantee funds, as well as to try to identify which approaches or
program structures may be best suited for countries at different levels of economic
development. This will be accomplished by exploring the nature of the banking industry
in relation to small businesses, the international experience in guarantee fund programs,
and examining why there exists a need for such programs amongst small businesses.

Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of small business loan
guarantee funds, as well as their role in economic development, particularly in less
developed countries. To this end, the various operating structures that exist
internationally will be explored, with particular emphasis on differences in structure
between developed countries and less developed countries. The role of banking in small
business development will also be explored in order to understand the allocation of credit
by banks.

The overarching research question is whether certain guarantee fund structures are better
suited for different levels of economic development, or for meeting different types of
economic development goals. Furthermore, if the structure does matter, can a system be
developed to help policy makers choose the structure that best fits their unique
circumstances and economic development goals?

A variety of topics will be explored in order to answer these questions. These include
describing the general nature of guarantee funds, how they operate, their intended impact,
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and the theoretical support basis for why they are needed. Furthermore, the variety of
different structures will be examined, including their strengths and weaknesses, in order
to better understand which structure best fits particular situations.

Methodology
As there are great difficulties quantifying and measuring the impact of an economic
development program, such as a loan guarantee fund, a qualitative approach that first
pursues an understanding of loan guarantee programs and then arrives at some
conclusions as to their effectiveness based on perceived performance is followed. Based
on these observations, it finalizes with recommendations. The literature on the topic,
including empirical research, statistics, program materials, and other writings on the
subject, will be studied in order to develop an understanding of the different types of
guarantee funds, as well as the nature of the operations and desired outcomes. With the
major types of guarantee fund programs identified, a review of each type will be
undertaken to better understand their strengths and weaknesses, specific requirements and
the situations in which they appear to be most effective.

To place all of this information into context, the role of credit and banking in small
business development will also be examined. The literature on this subject is more
widespread and more quantitative. This should lend itself to creating a more objective
determination of what is needed, in terms of credit assistance, for small business
development in various situations.
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Literature Review—A Brief Overview
The following section is a brief overview of the literature and research on small business
loan guarantee funds used to create this paper. A more detailed discussion of the various
topics and outcomes of the research will follow in later sections.

While the research on loan guarantee based mechanisms for small business development
is not extensive, it does provide a useful base of literature to draw from. However, a
recurring theme throughout the literature is the need for more research to provide better
direction for practitioners. Due to the relatively small size of most of these programs
relative to their national economy, accurately measuring their outcomes is a continuing
difficulty. Much of the literature has been centered on the theoretical workings of these
programs, or on studying the structure and general metrics of existing funds. While this
research has helped to develop a body of literature, a fair amount has been contradictory,
and very little consensus exists as to what funds are genuinely successful, or if guarantee
funds are even an effective development tool at all. Furthermore, the way in which funds
are typically categorized in the literature is very broad and does not adequately address
the differences between fund types within a category. This leaves practitioners in an
extremely difficult position, as they often have incomplete information, as well as little
concrete evidence, to draw from when structuring a guarantee fund.

Several large international organizations have published reports regarding Guarantee
Funds. One of the most thorough was published by the International Labor Organization
(a specialized agency of the United Nations) entitled ―Guarantee Funds for Small

5
Enterprises: A manual for guarantee fund managers‖ (Molenaar and Deelen 2004). This
manual provides a comprehensive overview of the operations, processes and procedures
of a Guarantee Fund. However, it only offers a very brief and generalized summary of
the different models in use and does not go into sufficient detail regarding their strengths
and weaknesses. While it does cover the operations of two different categories of funds,
it does so in an extremely generalized way, giving no guidance to the practitioner on
other options available, or how to adapt the program to their specific situation. The
World Bank published a large report entitled ―Finance for All: Policies and Pitfalls in
Expanding Access‖ that includes a section on Guarantee Funds (World Bank 2008).
While this report presents many of the positives and negatives of Guarantee Funds in
general, particularly as they relate to developing countries, it does not go into detail about
the various forms of Guarantee Funds or any significant details about their operations. A
report created by USAID entitled ―Designing Loan Guarantees to Spur Growth in
Developing Countries‖ also offers an overview of guarantee funds in less developed
countries (Freedman 2004). While this report does have a section regarding loan
guarantees to SME‘s, the majority of the report is focused on larger guarantees, such as
for infrastructure projects. However, the report does offer a very thorough analysis of the
poor state of credit availability in less developed countries, why this inhibits their growth,
and how guarantee funds of any type can address this issue.

Unfortunately, much of the work regarding measurements of the economic impact of loan
guarantees has been conducted by a small body of authors and is relatively limited. The
most relevant of this research is a recent study of the Small Business Administration‘s
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loan guarantee programs by the United States Federal Reserve. This study examined
extremely detailed data within areas of cities and found a correlation between the
presence of SBA loans and higher employment levels, particularly in low income areas
(Craig, Jackson and Thomson 2008). Other studies by the same authors though found
weaker correlations between SBA loans and other indicators, such as per capita income,
and the authors pointed out that their results were not conclusive. To date, this is the only
research I have found that has empirically measured the economic impact of a guarantee
fund.

Several research articles exist seeking to compare Guarantee Funds across various
countries and to compare their results empirically. The most thorough of these is a World
Bank working paper entitled ―The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds Around
the World‖ (Beck, Klapper and Mendoza 2008). This paper includes the results of a
survey of 76 guarantee funds around the world regarding a large variety of characteristics
(though the survey data was refined to 46 useable samples). The research showed the
level of government involvement in programs, the level of pricing, which borrowers were
eligible, the processes used by the fund, and the use of risk management techniques
among many other elements. A correlation analysis was also performed using the survey
data alongside GDP data for each respective country. While the data is exhaustive, and a
broad picture of guarantee funds around the world can be formed, the author‘s are unable
to draw many conclusions aside from the prevalence of government support and the lack
of risk management techniques. They state the primary reason for this is the difficulty in
comparing programs across diverse economies without time series or loan level data.
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Furthermore, while the authors attempted to categorize funds by a variety of factors, there
were still gaps in this data, including eight funds claiming not to fit in any category, and
two funds claiming to fit into all categories. A similar, but more geographically focused
report was prepared by the Go Network (a European Union funded project) entitled
―Benchmark Analysis of the Credit Guarantee Organizations in the Central, Adriatic,
Danubian and South-Eastern European Space (CADSES)‖ (Go Network 2006). This
report attempts to establish benchmarks for the roles of Guarantee Funds throughout 18
countries in Europe. The countries are grouped into peer groups based on GDP level and
comparisons are conducted utilizing a range of statistics, such as number of guarantee
fund organizations, number of small businesses, and amount of loans guaranteed, among
others. The report also offers individual country analysis. While there is some
discussion of different types of guarantee funds, this is mostly limited to contrasting
programs with public support versus those primarily supported privately. Another
comparison report was created by the Asian Development Bank entitled ―People‘s
Republic of China: Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Credit
Guarantee Companies‖ (Davies 2007). In creating the report, the author studied the 25
largest SME guarantee funds worldwide and compared them on a variety of factors. This
report reiterated many of the common findings of the other studies, which are that
governments are heavily involved and risk mechanisms are rare. While the report is
valuable in comparing large programs in developed countries, it does not explore
programs in developing countries.
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Other research on guarantee programs has typically involved either a case study or
empirical research on a single guarantee program or a small cohort of programs. The
most common areas of empirical research involve trying to determine whether the loans
are actually additional, that is they would not have been made without the guarantee
(Cowan, Drexler and Yanez 2008; Cukauskiene 2006; Riding, Madill and Haines 2007;
Zecchini and Ventura 2009), and the economic impact of guarantee funds
(Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006; Benavente, Galetovic and
Sanhueza; Bradshaw 2002; Park 1995; Oh et al. 2009) or both of these factors (Boocock
and Shariff 2005). These papers come to widely differing conclusions regarding the
outcomes of guarantee funds.. For example, Riding, et al, estimates that in a Canadian
fund almost 75% of loans would not have been made at the same terms without the
guarantee, while Zecchini, et al. find that only 12% of the total loan amounts in an Italian
fund were actually additional. Regarding the economic impact of guarantee funds, for
example, Bradshaw finds that a California fund helped recipients avoid cutting 14% of
their workforce, while Oh, et al, call into question the long term economic impact of a
South Korean fund, since guarantees seemed to be aimed at helping less productive firms
survive rather than helping firms grow or innovate. These differences can likely be
contributed to differences in the structure of the guarantee fund, differences in the
economy they operate in, and differences in research methodology between the studies.

Capital access programs (CAP‘s) are a type of guarantee based mechanism to support
SME lending, but differ from traditional guarantee funds in how their funds are handled.
They are most prevalent in the United States, with the first program being created in
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Michigan in 1986. Though more than 20 states and several municipalities operate
CAP‘s, there is a dearth of literature on the subject, particularly recent research. These
types of programs, though directed at the same problem and utilizing essentially the same
mechanism, are also almost never mentioned in the general guarantee fund literature. The
United States Treasury published several comprehensive reviews between 1998 and
2001of CAP‘s operating in the United States (United States Treasury 2001), however no
reviews or further research has been completed since then. The Treasury report
concluded that CAP‘s were able to reach borrowers that are otherwise poorly served by
other lending programs, and that CAP‘s were responsible for some level of job retention
and creation. The Michigan Strategic Fund and the Michigan Jobs Commission funded a
report on the Michigan Capital Access Program in 1998 (Hamlin 1998). This report
found that 88% of recipients of CAP loans met the criteria of being ―almost bankable‖
and likely would not have received the loan otherwise. Furthermore, the research found
that the program did promote job growth and economic development in excess of its
costs.

While the literature does not provide a consensus as to the effectiveness of guarantee
funds, it does provide extensive research material and can be greatly utilized in detailing
how funds operate, as well as in differentiating between types of funds. Though there are
various attempts to categorize guarantee programs by broad criteria, there is very little to
describe the differences within these categories. More importantly, there is little
guidance involving what characteristics of a fund may make it suitable for a particular
situation or level of local economic development. Furthermore, a significant gap in the
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literature exists in relation to Capital Access Programs. The following research seeks to
fill these gaps by more thoroughly examining the variety of guarantee fund mechanisms,
and by including capital access programs in the comparison
I will now detail what a guarantee fund is, how it works, why it is used, and the most
common types. Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of the different types of
funds, as well their outcomes will be explored to identify what can be learned from these
experiences, particularly for countries at different levels of economic development.
Finally, the nature of small business in an economy, as well as the role of banking in
small business development will be explored to provide important background for better
understanding the role of guarantee funds.
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Chapter 2
Guarantee Fund Basics
A guarantee fund, in its most common form, is an independent entity that acts as a third
party between a lending bank and a borrower who does not meet all of the bank‘s
qualifications, but are otherwise considered a good credit risk. The guarantee fund
provides the bank security, in the form of a guarantee for a portion of the loan, in order to
enable the borrower to obtain a loan. In an international survey, guarantee programs in
both developed and developing countries were rated as the government program that
most influenced the bank‘s involvement with SME‘s (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008)

Guarantee Funds (GF) are typically targeted toward a specific group of potential
borrowers that are seen as being underserved by the formal credit markets, but whose
success is deemed to be important to the development of a group of people, an industry or
a region (Honohan 2008). Although guarantee funds exist to cover many different kinds
of borrowers, including large corporations, and even governments, the focus of this
research is on those targeted at small and medium sized businesses. However, though
they can also be targeted toward more specific SME borrowers, such as borrowers in
inner cities or rural areas, borrowers in certain industries such as agriculture or
technology, or toward borrowers in certain demographics, such as women or ethnic
minorities. In any of these instances, there will often be potential borrowers who have
strong business plans and are otherwise good credit risks, but do not quite meet all of a
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bank‘s requirements to obtain credit, most typically regarding collateral. This is
particularly true of smaller borrowers. A review of over 50,000 Italian loans found that
smaller firms are typically required to post more collateral than larger firms (Pozzolo
2004). Unless they can overcome the missing requirements, the borrower must find
financing elsewhere, often at a drastically higher cost, if it is available at all.

A guarantee fund helps borrowers to overcome this credit gap by providing the bank a
loan guarantee as a substitute, or in some cases, in addition to, any collateral required by
the bank. This mechanism allows borrowers to utilize the formal banking sector, which
not only lowers their costs, but as the bank and GF will require more extensive reporting,
it typically helps move the company toward more professional practices. Furthermore,
the borrower will begin building a formal credit history which will make gaining future
loans more likely. From the banks side, they gain new customers, as well as experience in
lending to new sectors (Honohan 2008).

How does a Guarantee Fund Operate?
The creation of a guarantee fund begins with an initial investment of capital. This capital
is often provided by a government (from the city level to the national level), or by a nongovernmental organization or donor with an interest in promoting development in a
specific sector or region.

The Guarantee Fund then creates partnership agreements with banks that lay out specific
operating arrangements. These agreements may vary amongst partner banks, but will
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typically include items such as the types of borrowers eligible for guarantees, the size,
duration and purpose of loans, and the mechanism for paying the guarantees in the event
of a default.

There are a variety of guarantee fund structures, but a typical series of steps a borrower
will take are as follows:



A borrower first applies directly to a bank for a loan



The bank will review the application and recommend approval or denial



If the application is approved as is, the loan will be granted and the GF will not be
involved



If the loan is not approved because the borrower‘s application is inadequate in
some way, such as lacking a required level of collateral, and they meet the criteria
for borrowers laid out in the agreement between the bank and the Guarantee Fund,
they will be referred to the Guarantee Fund



The application will be forwarded to the guarantee fund (by the bank or by the
borrower), for their review



The GF will independently review the loan application for approval or denial.
The level of investigation will vary with the type of program.



If the loan application is approved, the GF provides the bank a guarantee for the
required amount of collateral, and the loan is issued
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The borrower will repay the bank, and will also pay the guarantee fund an annual
fee (typically between 2-5% of the loan value which can be included in the loan
payments)



If the borrower repays the loan, the GF is released from its guarantee



If the borrower defaults on the loan, and the bank meets all of its obligations in
attempting to collect on the debt, the GF will reimburse the bank for the agreed
amount.

Advantages of a Guarantee Fund
There are several advantages, in terms of economic development, to employing capital in
a guarantee fund rather than in typical lending entities (even those providing very low
interest loans). The biggest advantage is that a GF is able to highly leverage its capital,
allowing much greater impact from the investment. Because a GF doesn‘t actually make
loans, but instead issues guarantees against its capital, as long as partner banks agree, the
GF can issue far more in guarantees than it actually holds in capital, typically from 5 to
10 times the amount of capital. For example, the Thailand Guarantee Fund operates at a
multiple of 7 (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006). However, in some
industrialized countries, leverage can reach 20-25 times (Davies 2007; Levitsky 1997)

A well operated fund operating for 5 years should reasonably expect to have a multiple of
5, meaning $1 million in capital can realistically translate into $5 million in guarantees to
banks. Depending on the operation of the fund, the guarantee will typically be for
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between 50-80% of the loan amount. This means that the actual amount loaned to
SME‘s, based on $1 million in guarantee capital may be between $6.25 million and $10
million. Many well established guarantee funds can reach a multiple of 10 after 7-10
years of operation, and adding a re-guarantee program, as exists in Japan and Germany
can increase the multiple to 20 or more (Davies 2007). As the loans are repaid, the fees
earned will increase the amount of capital available, further increasing the amount of
loans made available.

This powerful multiplier is just one of the advantages of guarantee funds though.
Another advantage is access to the formal credit markets for underserved groups. For
example, when many small businesses need credit, their only option is the informal, or
grey, market, which may range from family and friends, to less than scrupulous money
lenders. While borrowing from family and friends may have a low monetary cost, it
comes with other costs, such as emotional stress, as well as putting a heavy strain on a
family‘s financial security. Borrowing from a grey market money lender is also
problematic because it will often come at prices 2 – 5 times higher than banks
(Wattanapruttipaisan 2003; Colwell 2008). By accessing the formal credit market
through the use of guarantees, borrowers can lower their costs of capital and their risks
significantly (Arping, Lуrбnth and Morrison 2008). Furthermore, the business practices
of both borrowers and existing financial institutions are improved. The higher degree of
reporting that a bank may require can help push the business to more professional
practices, while the bank will gain experience working with a new type of borrower that
they otherwise would not have engaged. Finally, creating a relationships with a bank will
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not only improve the borrowers chances of getting future loans with less security, but will
also create a credit history for them to present to other lenders.

Another advantage of guarantee funds is that they provide a business solution to a social
problem, rather than simply a charitable solution. Because it is not a low interest loan,
there is a better chance that businesses with an actual need to access credit will receive
the assistance. The reason for this is that low interest loans have significant competition
for limited funds, some of which will inevitably go to people who don‘t need cheap
money (whether through fraud, insufficient credit appraisals, or personal connections
with the lender). While low interest loans certainly have their place, and are an
extremely valuable development tool, a guarantee fund provides an option for borrowers
that can borrow at market prices, thus freeing up more low interest loans for those that
they are truly targeted toward.

What type of credit is guaranteed
Guarantees are used to facilitate access to a variety of different kinds of credit, including
for starting a new business from scratch, expanding or purchasing new equipment for an
existing business, and providing working capital to finance the day to day operations of a
business. While this is a little explored area of guarantee fund operations, but it may be
instructive to examine the issue.

The majority of guarantee funds do not place a great deal of restrictions on the use of the
loan (with the exception of common disclaimers barring their use for such things as
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illegal activities or stock speculation). However, there is one notable exception. The
largest Canadian guarantee fund, the Canadian Small Business Financing Program
(known as the CSBF), for example, does not allow guarantees for working capital
(Riding, Madill and Haines 2007; Heron & Company 2007). This is in sharp contrast to
Japanese guarantee funds that have the vast majority of their guarantees (85%) covering
working capital (Levitsky, Prasad and Ranga N. 1995). The CSBF chose to restrict
working capital loans from the program because of the fear that they would have higher
default rates than asset backed loans, though they have continued to explore the subject
since at least 1998.

The CSBF commissioned a report specifically regarding working capital in 2006. The
report found that SME borrowers seeking working capital loans were not likely to be
turned down at a higher rate by banks, and that banks did not take the type of loan
(investment or working capital) into consideration when making the appraisal, leaving the
author to conclude that there was no clear funding gap for SME‘s needing working
capital (Riding 2006). The report did conclude that it was likely that a certain class of
relatively risky firms, such as startups and young firms with little collateral, do have
difficulties in receiving working capital loans, and these would be the most likely
recipients of guarantees. The report generally had an unfavorable view of expanding the
program to include working capital loans, based primarily on the lack of a demonstrated
funding gap, as well as the increased riskiness of the borrowers likely to receive the
guarantee. The report relied heavily on interviews with bankers, and statistics regarding
rejected applications. This seems to give a very narrow view of the issue. An analysis of
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default rates on the different types of loans or by different types of borrowers would have
seemed beneficial, as well as a discussion on the role of working capital versus
investment loans for economic development.

There was an interesting contradiction in the report however, regarding how banks regard
working capital loans. The author finds that banks do not judge loans based on their
purpose (working capital or investment), stating in the report‘s conclusion:

Both qualitative and quantitative data reflect that the use of the proceeds
of loans do not figure into commercial lenders‘ decisions on loan
applications. (Riding 2006, pg. 22)

However, in an earlier section describing interviews with bankers, there are several
quotes from different bankers that point out the riskiness of working capital loans. For
example: ―working capital loans are much riskier‖ and ―working capital is the most risky
loan you can do.‖ (Riding 2006)

It would have seemed prudent to explore this contradiction further, since it would seem
obvious that if bankers consider them more risky, they would certainly take that into
account in their approval decisions.

A later report conducted for the CSBF regarding administrative functions pointed out that
there did not seem to be a reason for the differentiation in loan types by the guarantee
fund, and recommended that the CSBF change its rules to allow working capital loans
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(Heron & Company 2007). As of March 2010, the CSFB does not allow loans for
working capital (Canada Small Business Finance Programkotec 2010).

As most funds have little restrictions on the type of credit they will guarantee, there are
few other mentions in the literature on the distinction between types of credit. An
exception is research on the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee program that found
guaranteed loans for working capital defaulted at a higher rate than loans made for
investments (though no distinction was made for startups versus existing businesses;
Cowling and Mitchell 2003).
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Chapter 3
Types of Guarantee Funds
There are currently a wide variety of guarantee funds operating all over the world. In
their earlier forms, most programs followed one of a few common models, typically retail
or portfolio; however, as the programs have evolved, many have developed unique traits
to suit their specific needs, and several hybrid models have been introduced as well.
Therefore categorizing guarantee funds has become something of a challenge. While
there are still several broad categories of operations, many other factors play a prominent
role in the structure of a guarantee fund as well, making it important to not become too
encumbered by old labels.

All of the guarantee programs described here have the same basic objective, to allow a
creditworthy SME or entrepreneur, who does not quite meet a bank‘s lending
requirements, to be able to receive a loan. This is accomplished by a third party, the GF,
offering to guarantee a significant portion of the loan in the event of a default. Typically,
no collateral is actually issued by the guarantee fund to the bank; instead the bank accepts
a claim on the guarantee fund‘s capital or the full faith and credit of the government
supporting the fund. In the event of a default, a contract between the bank and the GF
will spell out the steps a bank must take to receive payment, including what steps the
bank must have taken to collect on the loan. After payment is made to the bank, the GF
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may continue to seek to collect from the borrower. Many parts of this process are
virtually identical, regardless of the structural differences of the funds.

Traditionally, the major difference in GF‘s was in their interactions with banks and with
borrowers. A retail guarantee fund will typically have some form of public presence and
will often have significant interaction with the borrower. Borrowers are typically
referred to the GF by a bank in the event their loan application does not meet
requirements; though in some cases a borrower may apply to the GF first. Independent
loan appraisals are a key trait of retail GF‘s and are conducted before the guarantee is
approved. The time necessary for the loan appraisal varies depending on the program, as
well as the complexity of the loan. As an example of the time necessary, Kafalat, the
Lebanese SME guarantee program, states that a decision will be made in a maximum of 3
weeks, though smaller loans tend to receive decisions quicker, usually in 7 days (Kafalat
S.A.L. 2010). This time frame seems relatively standard for most retail GF‘s.
Interaction during repayment can also vary greatly among retail GF models, but often
there is at least some extra degree of monitoring.

Due to the duplication of services, particularly the independent loan appraisal and
monitoring, retail GF‘s are considered the most costly model. This cost is considered
justified by many GF practitioners because of the extra layer of oversight, as well as the
fact that the GF may have a special knowledge of a group of borrowers which allows it to
conduct a more accurate appraisal than a bank (Colwell 2008). Another significant
advantage of retail GF‘s is the personal contact with the borrower. This not only
improves the appraisal of the loan, but a retail GF can also require the borrower to
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perform certain actions to receive a guarantee, such as attending educational events or
receiving mentoring or counseling that will increase their likelihood of success.

Retail guarantee funds were traditionally the most common form of GF, however, as
value of the extra oversight has been questioned, many GF‘s have moved to a portfolio
model. A portfolio guarantee fund creates partnerships with banks that allow for an
automatic guarantee mechanism essentially invisible to the borrower. A contract between
the bank and the GF details which borrowers are eligible for a guarantee, as well as fees
and other operating procedures. The bank chooses which eligible loans to apply for
guarantees and forwards the request to the guarantee fund. Depending on the
arrangement, the GF may do a cursory review, or in many cases, the guarantee will be
automatically granted in order to speed up processing time. The GF will typically
perform a regular review of the portfolio to insure compliance with the contract. A
portfolio approach is typically the least costly since it does not duplicate services with the
bank, and is often the most attractive to borrowers since it is the fastest and makes the
least requirements of them. Many portfolio models require very little time for approval
such as 2 days or less, and some don‘t require any prior approval at all, delegating the
responsibility to the bank which registers the loan after it is issued.

The prevalence of retail appraisals has been shrinking as more retail GF‘s have come to
rely on the bank‘s appraisal with only a cursory review of the application to ensure it
meets eligibility requirements. Many GF‘s also operate both retail and portfolio
operations simultaneously as well. In these hybrid models, banks typically begin a
relationship with the GF and have all of their applications independently reviewed at the
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beginning. After the bank has shown sufficient capacity in utilizing the program and
following guidelines, the bank may be allowed to use abbreviated applications, or granted
outright authority to make credit decisions. The United States‘ Small Business
Administration (SBA) is a large example of a hybrid fund. While the SBA still performs
individual loan reviews on a large number of applications, it has also created several
programs in which banks can simply submit abbreviated applications for qualified loans.
Depending on the program and the type of loan, these applications may be evaluated
within 1 day or in some cases automatically approved (Small Business Administration
2010). Other programs allow loans under a specific threshold to be approved
automatically on a portfolio basis, while loans over the threshold have to be
independently reviewed.

Variations of Guarantee Funds
Within these major categories of guarantee funds exists a multitude of variations. While
guarantee funds all over the world tend to operate in generally similar ways, many also
have unique aspects that differ greatly, even among otherwise very similar funds. While
several studies have examined the variations in major areas of the funds, such as
governance and funding, other unique aspects, such as how the guarantee level is set have
been little studied. As most of the guarantee fund literature from the major international
organizations tends to offer fairly generalized guidance, guarantee fund practitioners may
not realize all of the options they actually have available to them. What follows is a
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discussion of some of the variations of guarantee funds around the world, along with
examples of the variation in practice.

Highly Targeted Guarantee Funds
All of the guarantee funds discussed in this paper are targeted toward SME‘s, and many
have little or no restrictions about which SME borrowers qualify for guarantees.
However, some funds have much more specific targets within the SME group. Common
targets may be the type of industry (agriculture, technology), borrower demographics
(women, minority), and location (rural, urban centers). The primary benefit of targeting
is that economic development efforts can be sharply focused to promote growth in an
area policy makers deem necessary and important. Another potential advantage is that
the guarantee fund may have specialized knowledge about its target group that allows it
to make a better analysis than a bank would be able to. For example, South Korea
operates the Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), which is part of a larger
organization named Kibo. This program provides guarantees to SMEs involved in
technology related fields. The GF has developed a specialized system of Technology
Appraisal Centers (TAC) in order to provide guarantees based on the potential of new
and emerging technologies, rather than more common financial metrics. The fund states:

Kibo focuses our guarantee support on those technology-based enterprises,
start-up companies and venture firms which, in spite of their somewhat
poor prior achievements, we consider to have excellent technological
power as well as the potential to create Korea's future economic growth
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engines and to generate new employment. (Korea Technology Finance
Corporation, 2008, pg 13)

Traditional bank lenders would rarely, if ever, be willing to base a loan on an unproven
technology. However, by specializing in this area, KOTEC has been able to support
technology companies with high growth potential, while remaining sustainable and not
incurring an excessively high default rate. Similar evaluations are also made by rural and
agriculture based GF‘s as well.

The primary disadvantage of highly targeted GF‘s is that risk management is
compromised by having the loan portfolio concentrated in one area. A common risk
management technique among lenders is to diversify their portfolio in a variety of areas.
In this way the lender is not at risk of excessive losses if something adversely affects a
specific group of borrowers. By committing to supporting one group of borrowers, a
targeted GF will bear the full brunt of any diminished performance by the sector,
regardless of how well they screened their borrowers. Even without adverse conditions,
targeting has other risks. Depending on the size of the target, the GF may have difficulty
finding an adequate number of qualified borrowers, and thus may offer guarantees to
borrowers that they normally would not accept. This may be particularly true if there is
political pressure from leaders seeking to show that they are supporting a disadvantaged
community.

In choosing to target a fund very specifically, management should likely take the
increased risk into account and plan for increased support from those contributing to the
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fund. While it also may be possible to charge higher fees to compensate for the risk, the
higher cost of capital may well increase the default rate, forcing increased support
anyway. It would seem wiser to temper expectations and accept that some level of future
support will be necessary to continue to promote development of the target group.

Other examples of highly targeted guarantee funds exist as well. For example, Morocco
operates several targeted GF‘s, including the FGIC, which is aimed at small and mediumsize enterprises involved in the art and entertainment industry, as well as a GF targeted at
young entrepreneurs (Morocco Ministry of Economy and Finance 2010). Lithuania
operates the Rural Credit Guarantee Fund which only offers guarantees for small
businesses involved in agriculture or located in primarily agricultural areas (Rural Credit
Guarantee Fund-Lithuania 2010).

Mutual Guarantee Institutions
Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI‘s) are organizations made up of companies from the
same industry or region, which join together in order to seek more favorable credit terms
and availability. These programs are often created and administered by trade associations
or chambers of commerce. Member companies pay fees or pledge collateral which are
pooled together to form a guarantee fund. Contractual arrangements are then made with
banks to offer credit to members, often at a lower rate than they could receive without the
guarantee. When members receive these loans, they pay an additional fee, usually a
percentage of the loan amount, to the guarantee fund.
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Italy is widely recognized as having the most prevalent network of MGI‘s, though they
are also found in smaller numbers in Germany, France, Spain and other areas around the
world. Approximately 12% of SME loans in Italy are made with the backing of a MGI
(Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2009).

Mutual Guarantee Institutions are typically not funded solely by members. In fact, in
many cases, only 1/3 of the guarantee‘s capital is from members, with the rest being
contributed by governments or NGOs (Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2009).
MGI‘s have been shown to both decrease the cost of capital and increase access to
capital, although not by particularly significant amounts (Columba, Gambacorta and
Mistrulli 2008). Furthermore the authors find that the size of the MGI is important to
determining the improvement in interest rates offered to members. As an MGI grows,
banks are more willing to offer better terms. However, at some point, membership grows
too large for the MGI to adequately monitor members and defaults will rise, thus making
banks insist on higher interest rates to compensate for the increased risk (Columba,
Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2008).

Mutual Guarantee Institutions have the advantage of a built in screening mechanism
through membership in the organization. The greater knowledge that the MGI has about
its members, both before the loan and during repayment, has the potential to greatly
improve default rates. The MGI may restrict certain members from accessing the
guarantee fund if there are concerns about its finances. While the these organizations are
typically far too large for members to police each other during repayment (such as in
many micro lending schemes like the Grameen Bank), members still have incentives to
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insure the administration of the program is diligent in its duties, because any default will
put the group‘s capital at risk and could result in worse borrowing conditions for
companies in the future. The MGI also has the advantage of needing less government or
donor funding due to the member contributions.

A typical example of how a Mutual Guarantee Institution works in Italy is Fidindustria,
which supports small businesses in the Bari province of southern Italy. To apply, local
SMEs must submit 3 years worth of financial records and make a one-time payment of
500 Euro. They also must provide a 3000 Euro letter of credit that is added to the
guarantee fund capital. When the member wants to take a loan, they pay a fee (based on
risk, maturity and loan amount) to the guarantee fund. The coverage ratio for all loans is
50% (Fidindustra 2010).

Capital Access Programs

A Capital Access Program (CAP) is a unique form of loan guarantee mechanism. While
the objectives are identical to other GF‘s, allowing nearly qualified SME borrowers to
access credit by providing banks with a guarantee of partial repayment on default, the
methodology is quite different. A CAP is similar to a portfolio guarantee fund in
allowing banks to make the credit appraisal, but differs greatly in how loans are
guaranteed and how the program operates and is funded. Capital Access Programs have
elements of an insurance program, loan loss reserve account and economic development
program.
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Banks choose which borrowers they will include in the program, and the only paperwork
involved is typically a short application form enrolling the loan and certifying that it
qualifies for the program (in many cases this can be filed after the loan has already been
made, meaning there is no delay for the borrower). The bank charges the borrower a fee,
which is a percentage of the loan amount, and could be thought of as an insurance
premium paid by the borrower in order to obtain the loan. This percentage is negotiated
between the borrower and lender and depends on how risky they judge the borrower to
be; typically the fee will range from 1% to 5%. At this point, the process is identical to a
bank charging a risk premium to a borrower and creating a private loan loss reserve.
However, under this program, the CAP then matches the fee amount dollar for dollar, or
occasionally by a higher multiple. These funds are then deposited into an account owned
by the CAP (but often held at the lending bank). The funds deposited in this account are
not tied to a specific loan, but rather grow over time and can be used to cover any CAP
loans that default. The bank can only access these funds in the event a CAP loan default
(it remains the CAP‘s money otherwise), and only under the contractually agreed upon
terms. If a defaulted loan is for more than the amount held in the CAP account, the bank
is liable for the rest of the loss. However, as the bank enrolls more loans, the CAP
deposits can grow large enough to provide a strong cushion against defaults.

Capital access programs are almost exclusively found in the United States and run by
individual states, although several large cities have implemented programs as well.
Eligibility for the program is normally fairly broad and covers most small businesses.
However, CAP‘s often adjust their match multiple, depending on the borrower, to better
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accomplish economic development goals. For example, Illinois increases its match to 1.5
for loans to women, minorities and the disabled, and to 2 times for loans in Federal
Enterprise Zones, while Connecticut contributes an amount equal to 30% of the loan for
borrowers in designated urban areas (United States Treasury 2001), and Ohio has
recently begun offering a contribution equal to 80% of the loan amount for state certified
minority businesses (Ohio Dept of Development 2009).

There are several key advantages to capital access programs. From the bank and
borrower‘s perspective, the speed and simplicity of the program are almost unmatched.
From an economic development perspective, the program is able to focus its efforts on
specific targets to better accomplish policy goals. From the state or municipality‘s
perspective that is funding the program, they have a defined financial risk that cannot
change, unlike conventional guarantee funds that could face unexpectedly high defaults
that would require substantial additional state funds to cover. Capital access programs
are also generally considered to have much lower operational costs, since they typically
have very low administrative overhead and do not need to perform any of the loan review
or collection activities that a traditional GF conducts. The average state run CAP only
employs the equivalent of 1.3 full time workers (United States Treasury 2001).

Capital access programs should also have a high probability of increasing the amount of
loans that would not have been made otherwise, which is known as financial additionality
or incrementality. While banks may prefer to have borrowers pay the highest fee allowed
by the CAP in order to build their loss reserve quickly, borrowers may reject a high fee if
they can receive the loan at a lower cost elsewhere. This helps to insure additionality
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because practitioners assume that borrowers know their options and would not accept a
higher price to participate in a CAP when they could get a loan at a lower rate elsewhere.
However, the assumption that borrowers are always well informed may not be accurate,
as was pointed out in a study of the Michigan CAP that found almost one third of
borrowers did not know they were participating in the program or were paying extra fees
(Hamlin 1998). While these loans may well be truly additional, it also may be possible
that borrowers do not adequately explore their options prior to accepting the loan, simply
accept the price their banker offers without negotiating, or may be taken advantage of by
unscrupulous bankers. This issue is not confined to CAPs, as the same thing could occur
with portfolio guarantee funds as well. However, due to the speed, simplicity and virtual
invisibility of CAP‘s versus GF‘s, there is a greater likelihood of a borrower being
unaware they were not receiving a standard loan. Requiring disclosure of fees and some
level of borrower education would seem to be a prudent move to insure that banks aren‘t
simply enrolling loans they would have made outside the program simply because they
know they can charge an unwitting borrower a higher fee and build up their loss reserve
account.

Capital access programs have drawbacks as well. A conventional guarantee fund is often
politically popular because it requires an early investment that promises to support a
much greater amount of loans with very little follow up support (at least in theory), while
a CAP requires substantial investments by the funding authority for at least the early
years of the fund, and in some cases into perpetuity. Programs differ in how they allow
funds to re-circulate, which in turn impacts the program‘s level of self-sustainability. For
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example, in the Hawaii Capital Access Program, when a bank‘s loss reserve fund reaches
33% of its outstanding CAP loans, any excess can be withdrawn and re-circulated to
support new loans by any bank in the program. Furthermore, the state also withdraws all
interest earned by the reserve account and can re-circulate those funds as well (Hawaii
Dept of Business 2002). However, in the Arkansas CAP, banks are allowed to let their
loss reserve balance grow indefinitely (which means they can be well over 100% of
outstanding loans), and banks are allowed to keep half of the interest earned (Arkansas
Development Finance Authority 2010). This means that the CAP must always rely on
state funding for new loans.

Therefore, particularly in the early years, CAP‘s are always in danger of being shut down
due to budget issues or political shifts, and this uncertainty may dissuade banks from
participating. Furthermore, poor economic conditions may cause an increase in default
rates which could dramatically decrease the level of the bank‘s loss reserve accounts. In
this case the program would almost certainly require extra funding to replace the excess
funds they had expected to withdraw and re-circulate.

Banks also may be unwilling to take on risky loans through the program when first
starting because the funds deposited would only cover a small fraction of the loan in the
event of a default. Several states have addressed this by providing a significantly higher
matching deposit for a bank‘s first several loans. For example, Ohio contributes 50% of
the loan amount for a bank‘s first 3 loans, allowing them to build a loan loss reserve very
quickly (Ohio Dept of Development 2009). Other states have offered credit lines to
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cover early defaults; these credit lines are then repaid with future bank contributions to
the CAP deposit (United States Treasury 2001).

Capital access programs also leverage their invested capital differently than traditional
guarantee funds. For comparison, consider a traditional GF which has $10 million in
capital that they are able to leverage 5 times at a 75% coverage ratio. Thus they can
guarantee a total of $66.6 million in SME loans at any one time. Given an average
maturity of 3 years, the GF would provide approximately $22 million a year in
guaranteed loans (loan maturity greatly alters this figure, making a comparison such as
this purely for illustration purposes). A capital access program by contrast may receive
funding of $1 million a year. If the average fees paid by the bank and borrower were a
combined 4%, and the matched dollar for dollar by the CAP, the program could cover
$25 million in loans per year. For illustration purposes, assume only one bank is
involved in the CAP. After one year the loss reserve deposit would total $2 million, or
8% of the total loans (well above most SME default rates anywhere in the world).

After 10 years, the CAP would have had $10 million invested by the government,
funding approximately $250 million in loans. Over this time the loan loss account would
have had $20 million deposited. Even assuming a very high default rate of 6%, equaling
$15 million in losses, the reserve fund would still have a $5 million balance, plus any
interest earned over the 10 year period and no future loss risk to the government. In
contrast, the traditional guarantee fund with its initial $10 million dollar investment could
have guaranteed around $223 million in SME loans. However, this figure could be
highly variable depending on the amount of leverage the fund was able to use, the costs
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incurred by the fund and the maturity of the loans. If the loans had long maturities, the
fund would not have been able to turn them over quickly, thus reducing its total loan
amount. Furthermore, if the default rate was unexpectedly high, the government could
face substantial future liabilities.

Though starting and funding a CAP comes with the added political difficulty of indefinite
continued funding, the CAP model offers several distinct advantages to a traditional GF.
Most notable are the reduced risk undertaken by the government, the more certain
financial projections available, and the low cost of operations.

Market Based Funds

While a variety of funds adjust their pricing and coverage ratio based on targeted
borrowers or bank performance, these are arbitrary figures arrived at by the organization
and may not be efficient. The Chilean guarantee fund, FOGAPE, is unique in that it uses
market mechanisms to set coverage ratios and allocations for the amount of guaranteed
loans participating banks can make. The coverage ratios and allocations are determined
through an auction in which banks bid on the level of coverage they will accept. For
example, if a bank is willing to accept coverage for 65% of its guaranteed loans, rather
than 70%, it can receive a higher allocation (Cowan, Drexler and Yanez 2008). While
one research study has shown that the guarantee coverage level can affect default rates
(Cowling 1998), it is likely that this is at least partially tied to economic conditions, as
well as other factors, such as the type or maturity of a loan. Given that economic
conditions change, and that different banks will choose to make different loans, it makes
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sense that this should be flexible helps to insure that FOGAPE is operating in as efficient
manner as possible. Why provide 75% coverage for a loan if a bank would be willing to
make it for 65% coverage and take some of the burden off of the guarantee fund or
government? While the Chilean guarantee fund has received a good deal of international
attention and interest, it is unclear whether other guarantee funds have actually adopted a
similar bid system.
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Chapter 4
Guarantee Fund Operations
Choosing Guarantee Recipients
A key element that distinguishes guarantee schemes from other government development
programs, such as loans or grants, is that they rely on banks to determine recipients.
Since banks have specific experience in judging the credit worthiness of borrowers, the
guarantee fund can leverage this expertise to help avoid bad borrowers (Arping, Lуrбnth
and Morrison 2008). While some schemes rely almost totally on the banks to determine
recipients, such as portfolio schemes and Capital Access Programs, many guarantee
funds, such as the United State‘s Small Business Administration, perform their own
credit appraisal on a large portion of their guarantees.

While the assessment increases the guarantee fund‘s costs, it is considered justified if the
fund has an information advantage that allows it to conduct a better review and thus
lower the default rate of guarantee recipients (Honohan 2008). However, many funds
that do not conduct independent assessments have very low default rates as well. These
funds rely on the bank‘s assessment to make the credit decision, as well as regulations
that penalize a bank for having excessive defaults. By penalizing banks, often by
restricting future guarantees, charging higher fees, or rejecting the guarantee claim in
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cases of non qualified loans being enrolled, the GF can provide incentives to the bank to
provide diligent monitoring and not attempt to exploit the program.

Banks and Guarantee Funds
Banks seem to certainly recognize the potential value of serving the SME market;
however, the potential profit is offset by the increased costs that come with serving this
market, and, therefore, banks find it necessary to develop new mechanisms and structures
to work with SMEs, as well as to adapt their business and risk models to reduce the risks
and costs of serving SMEs (De la Torre, Peria and Schmukler 2008; Davies 2007).
Guarantees can be an important part of a bank‘s plan to work with the SME market.

Banks have several incentives for involvement with a SME guarantee fund. Many banks
recognize the potential value of the SME market and see the use of guarantees as a way
to gain experience with the market. In the case of SBA guarantees, banks are able to
securitize the guaranteed portions of their loans and sell them on the securities market.
Rather than hold the loan themselves, the bank sells it to an investor who pays the bank a
lump sum in exchange for receiving the future payments. This allows the bank to quickly
regain capital that they can loan out again.

However, there are also several disincentives for banks to utilize guarantees. The most
commonly cited problems for banks are the additional bureaucratic tasks, such as
applications, and oversight, as well as difficulties in getting paid through the guarantee in
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the event of a default. Smaller banks seem to have the most trouble with repayments.
(Bradley and Kirtley 2008)

How Banks Utilize Guarantees
A recent survey (Temken and Theodos 2008) of lenders utilizing SBA guarantee
programs found that the lenders felt the guarantees allowed them to serve borrowers who
did not quite meet their conventional underwriting standards, but they still considered
attractive clients. The most common reason cited in the survey for a company‘s use of
an SBA guarantee is that company does not have adequate net operating income (NOI) to
meet the debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) required for a conventional loan term. By
utilizing the guarantee, lenders could extend the length of the loan beyond their normal
term to make the payments affordable to the borrower. The study‘s authors do not
provide survey statistics, but they do state that collateral constraints are the second most
common reason borrowers are referred to an SBA guarantee, particularly when the
borrower is purchasing specialized equipment that would be hard to liquidate in the event
of a default.

While some banks may prefer to have more of their borrowers covered by a guarantee,
competitive pressures are cited as the prime reason why borrowers do not utilize a
guarantee (Temken and Theodos 2008). Since utilizing a guarantee will virtually always
cost more than conventional financing, a rational borrower that can obtain a loan without
a guarantee will choose to do so. Therefore banks realize the risk of losing the client if
they require a guarantee when another bank would not. This phenomenon is also cited as
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evidence that guaranteed loans are truly additional, since companies would not pay a
higher rate if they did not have to. However, the evidence on additionality is
inconclusive. One possible explanation is that borrowers do not adequately shop for
loans, or fully understand their credit terms (see the section on financial additionality for
further discussion of borrower understanding).

Interest Rates and Fees for Guaranteed Loans
Interest rates for guarantee fund borrowers are determined in a variety of ways. Some
guarantee funds cap the interest charged on loans. For example, the SBA caps the rate at
a certain percentage above the prime rate (SBA 2010), though most leave it to the bank
and the borrower to negotiate. Nonetheless, total borrower costs are almost always
higher than conventional loans due to the Guarantee Fund‘s fee. For example, in the
Thailand Guarantee Fund, guaranteed borrowers do receive a lower rate, by about 1% ,
than they would have otherwise; however, after the loan fee is included, total costs are
still higher (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006). Members of Italian
Mutual Guarantee Institutions also were shown to receive a lower cost of capital than
similar non member borrowers; about 1.5 points lower interest rate than the bank average
for similar firms (correlating to 16-20% reduced borrowing costs; Zecchini and Ventura
2009). However, the authors do not state whether this savings was before or after the
guarantee fee, though it appears to be before the fee, meaning at least some, and possibly
all, of the savings are negated by the guarantee fee.
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While utilizing a guarantee will typically cost more for an SME than if they obtained
conventional financing, the relatively small difference is negligible when compared to the
higher costs many would be forced to pay if they accessed the grey market. This is
particularly true in developing countries, where informal lending rates can run as high as
30% per month for short term loans, and 10% per month for longer term loans (Davies
2007; Colwell 2008; Wattanapruttipaisan 2003). However, the same could be said for the
US market, given that many small business owners tap high interest credit cards for their
unmet funding needs (NSBA 2009).

While banks see the potential profit in serving the SME market, they often have greater
interactions with SME‘s in areas outside of conventional lending by offering other
services that entail less risk. For example, banks are more apt to offer short term secured
loans, as well as more use of immovable and personal guarantees. Furthermore, many
banks main interactions with SME‘s are through non lending products, such as payment
services, savings accounts, and advisory services (De la Torre, Peria and Schmukler
2008).
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Chapter 5
Measuring the Success of Guarantee Funds
There are enormous difficulties in measuring the success of virtually any economic
development efforts, and guarantee funds are no exception.

A common theme in the

guarantee fund literature is that there is no consensus on the effectiveness of guarantees,
few good evaluations of guarantees have been completed, and that better evaluations are
necessary in the future (Bartik and Bingham 1995; Boocock and Shariff 2005; Cressy
2002; Green 2003; Levitsky 1997). While measurements such as the total loans
distributed are easy to obtain, these are not considered particularly useful without being
put in the context of the cost of the loans and the outcome in the economy. Default rates,
which are an area researchers and policy makers are highly interested in, are often the
most difficult statistic to find, if they can be found at all. In the recent World Bank
survey of guarantee funds, only 7 of the 45 entries included both the figures for amount
of loans guaranteed and the amount paid out to banks in claims (Beck, Klapper and
Mendoza 2008). Even when they are reported, they often vary greatly from fund to fund
as to how they are determined, making comparisons very difficult. However, while
default rates are very important for determining the sustainability of a fund, they may be
a poor gauge for the effectiveness of a fund. A fund may have a high default rate, but it
also may be supporting fast growing businesses that contribute far more to the economy
than the fund sustains in losses.
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Ultimately, metrics like loans made and default ratios have to be judged in the context of
the economy and what effect the fund has had on the economy. While these metrics are
very important for determining the sustainability of the fund, they don‘t necessarily say
anything about the impact of the fund on the economy. The most common metrics for
judging the impact of a guarantee fund are typically economic additionality, which is the
improvement in the overall economy above the cost of the program, and financial
additionality, which measures the increase in credit available.

Economic Additionality
Economic additionality refers to the improvement in the overall economy of the area
studied, and is thus typically the main goal for any economic development effort. For a
government to put taxpayer funds at risk in support of private businesses there must be a
potential gain for the populace. Most commonly these gains will be in the form of
increased employment or wages for workers, increased profits for owners, and increased
tax revenue for the government, both through direct taxes paid by the business as well as
indirect taxes from increased employment and production.

However, even as a primary goal, there is very little definitive research on the economic
additionality of guarantee schemes. This is due to several often mentioned factors in the
research, including lack of adequate data, the relatively small scale of guarantee
programs, and the difficulty controlling for the multitude of variables at work in any
economy. As a simple example of this last point, firms in fast growing regions or
industries are more likely to have higher growth rates, regardless of their quality.
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Therefore, providing economic development assistance of any kind will allow for
positive results to be shown in terms of economic growth. However, the firms may well
have had equal growth without assistance (thus leaving the development resources to be
saved or spent elsewhere). On the other hand, slow growing regions that are most in need
of development assistance will have poorer overall results, but the actual impact of the
program may be much more positive, as without assistance, results could be much worse.
Some evidence of this comes from a Polish guarantee fund, LFP, in which the guarantee
fund‘s default rate and number of applications accepted closely tracked the national
economy (Bennett, Doran and Billington 2005). During a period of high growth in
Poland from 1998-2000, the fund issued a large number of guarantees with no losses.
However, as the economy became depressed after 2000, defaults rose and the fund denied
more applicants than in the previous period. Therefore, the overall economy seems to
play a particularly strong role in the perceived success of a guaranteed fund, and thus
should be considered when assessing a fund.

Difficulties notwithstanding, multiple attempts have been made to measure the economic
additionality of guarantee programs, with somewhat positive results. Some of the most
relevant studies of guarantee funds, with regard to this paper, have been conducted
through the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland on the SBA‘s loan guarantee programs.
These are the most rigorous studies to date that attempt to determine the economic impact
of loan guarantees. However, like most other studies, the authors take great pains to
caution readers regarding their research. Most notably the authors cite their inability to
control for other small business lending at the local market level, as well as their inability
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to test whether the SBA programs materially increase the volume of small business
lending in the market. Nonetheless, even given the constraints of their study, the authors
still conclude the following:

…we are still led to the strong possibility that at the margin, additional
credit allocation to low-income areas has a relatively higher level of
economic impact on employment. (Craig et al. 2008, pg. 357)

While the authors did not find a positive relationship between SBA lending in a market
and per capita income in the market, they did find a positive, although small, and
significant relationship between the level of SBA lending in a market and future personal
income growth, as well as a larger correlation on the average annual level of employment
(Craig, Jackson and Thomson 2007). A positive and significant correlation was also
found between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of
SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. Furthermore, the intensity of this
correlation is much larger in low-income markets. The authors point out that their results
suggest that this correlation is positive and significant only in low-income markets (Craig
et al. 2008).

Boocock & Shariff found that some levels of economic additionality, primarily through
employment growth, were observed in companies taking part in the Malaysian Guarantee
Corporation (Boocock and Shariff 2005). While the authors find that guarantee
recipients outperform the Malaysian SME sector in regard to employment growth, they
also point out that their methodology probably overstates the importance of the guarantee
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fund. Furthermore, the small sample size makes the data relatively suspect. Finally,
most of the employment gains were made by a very small number of firms (a
phenomenon that recurs in the GF literature). Removing just one of the top firms would
dramatically alter the results. On a macroeconomic scale, the guarantee fund was
credited with helping to stabilize the economy during the Asian crisis by increasing its
guarantee multiple from 9 to 15 in order to increase lending. However, the default rate
rose as well, requiring the government to eventually need to invest more capital in order
to lower the multiple and retain the confidence of lenders.

Boocock and Shariff also discuss the difficulties of enhancing economic additionality
because banks and governments have differing incentives. Banks are primarily interested
in loan repayment, not with building the economy, thus structuring a program to do both
becomes difficult.

A similar study was performed on the Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation of
Thailand. Guarantee recipients were compared with a cohort of 41 non guaranteed small
firms to determine differences in employment levels based on employment elasticity.
Although data availability limitations prevented results from being certain enough to
strongly infer that additional funds provided through guarantees directly help increase
employment opportunities, the overall results did suggest a positive relationship between
employment and total loan amount (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond
2006).
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Bradshaw (2002) performed an analysis of the California State Loan Guarantee Program
to determine its economic impact. By tracking actual employment changes at over 1000
firms over a 6 year period, the author found that employment increased in firms receiving
loan guarantees by 40% (4633 jobs by 759 firms, or 6 jobs per company). A group of
sample firms were surveyed and asked how many workers would have lost their jobs
were it not for the loan guarantee. Respondents reported an estimated 14.5%
employment loss without the guarantee. The smallest firms (those with fewer than 20
employees) credited the loan guarantee with helping to retain 16% of employment,
whereas larger firms retained 9%. The program also increased state tax revenue by $25.5
million, which was much greater than the $13 million cost of the program (Bradshaw
2002).

Further findings from this study found that employment gains were distributed among
370 firms, which increased total employment by 7,654 jobs (an average of 20 per firm),
whereas the losses were distributed among 297 firms, which lost 1,919 jobs (an average
of 6.5 per firm). The remaining 92 firms did not change. However, a relatively small
number of firms accounted for much of the actual job growth, whereas the majority of
firms contributed just a few jobs to total employment growth. Twelve firms grew by 100
or more jobs each; in total, these firms accounted for 2,879 (50.2%) of the jobs gained.
This means that 12 firms created the same number of jobs as the other 358 firms
combined. During this same time period though, small businesses in the state lost about
11% of jobs, meaning guarantee recipients did fare much better than other firms, even
exempting the high growth firms.
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The authors also point out that even if loans don‘t necessarily equate to employment
growth, they can still provide value to the economy. They cite the example of a surveyed
company that received a loan to implement a new labor saving technological process that
allowed them to remain competitive. The company said that without the loan, they would
have gone out of business and would have lost all 8 of their employees, but with the loan
they were able to retain 5 employees (Bradshaw 2002).

One of a recent series of studies commissioned by the SBA and performed by the Urban
Institute seek to determine the impact of the SBA‘s programs, including the loan
guarantee programs (Brash and Gallagher 2008). The study was conducted by obtaining
detailed firm level data on guarantee recipients for a period of three years before and after
receipt of an SBA guaranteed loan. The authors immediately point out that a definitive
answer to the question of whether SBA assistance helps the firms that receive it cannot be
obtained without an impact analysis that is outside the scope of their project. However,
they did find firms receiving an SBA guaranteed loan did have average sales and average
employment increases. Further findings showed that younger firms receiving loan
guarantees tended to have greater growth than older firms, and that industry and region of
the country were significantly related to changes in sales and employment.

For both sales and employment, a large percentage gain was typically seen in the first
year after the loan, with a slightly smaller gain in the second year, and a significantly
smaller gain seen in the third. However, when compared to the three years before the
loan, these results are not as positive. For example, the authors found that while sales
increased in the three years immediately following the loan, they actually grew at a

48
slower rate than the three years before the loan. The same was true of employment
growth, which occurred at a faster rate before the loan than after. Mean employment for
7(a) loans only increased by one employee per firm three years after loan receipt (Brash
and Gallagher 2008).

In other research, a study of the Canadian Small Business Fund (CSBF), though focused
on loan additionality, estimated the program was responsible for creating approximately
22,000 jobs per year in Canada (Riding, Madill and Haines 2007). Case studies of four
guarantee funds that were anecdotally judged to be successful found that they deserved
some credit for the deepening of the financial sector in their respective countries (Egypt,
Poland, Chile, India), and that guarantee funds are valuable in opening SME lending, but
their impact diminishes over time (Bennett, Doran and Billington 2005).

A particularly rigorous analysis of two South Korean guarantee programs that were
studied from 2000 to 2003, just after the Asian financial crisis, found that while
guarantees did have positive short term benefits, the study called into question the long
run benefits of the program. The guarantees were shown to help recipients maintain their
size, increase their hiring and sales, and improve their chances of survival (Oh et al.
2009). However, the authors also found that, compared to a matched group of firms that
did not receive the guarantees, recipients did not show productivity growth, nor did they
invest in research & development (R & D) at the same rate.

The authors of the South Korean study cited above concluded that guarantees were
tending to go to support less productive firms in order to improve their chances of
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survival. While this may have been beneficial to maintain employment in the wake of a
crisis, ultimately it resulted in overcapacity in the SME sector and allowed less
competitive firms to survive. This in turn would make the process of creative destruction
less efficient, which could hinder the economy as innovative firms struggle or are forced
out of the market by less competitive firms subsidized by guarantees.

Financial Additionality
Financial additionality, also known as incrementality, refers to the amount of loans made
under guarantees that would not have been made otherwise. In the present case, this
refers specifically to creditworthy SME‘s that would not have received a loan without the
participation of a guarantee fund.

Essentially, financial additionality is considered

necessary in order for a guarantee fund to itself be necessary. If the borrower could have
received the loan for much the same terms as without the guarantee, than the government
is essentially subsidizing lenders by taking on risk when the same outcome would have
been the same anyway.

Research regarding financial additionality has found mixed results. Utilizing a
methodology that is similar to credit scoring, a model was created through an analysis of
the Canadian Small Firms Loan Guarantee program which found incrementality
estimated at 74.8%, plus or minus 9% (with 95% confidence; Riding, Madill and Haines
2007) . While this was a very rigorous study, it only relied on survey data from one year
(2001), which somewhat limits the conclusions that can be drawn. None the less, this is
easily the highest empirically derived estimate in the literature. This study was updated

50
in 2009 and applied the previously created model to survey data from 2007. The author
found that the program seemed to be backing riskier loans, and estimated that
additionality had increased to between 80-85% (Riding 2009).

A study on the Chilean loan guarantee program found a significant impact on the
availability of credit for SME‘s because of the existence of the guarantee fund.
Furthermore, they found no significant effect on the default rates of borrowers utilizing a
guarantee. The authors state the following about these results, specifically noting what
type of borrower is most likely to be helped:

The explanation for this finding is that PCG (Partial Credit Guarantees)
alleviates a market failure in the equity markets, increasing the availability
of financing for entrepreneurs with low level of wealth. (Cowan, Drexler
and Yanez 2008, pg. 3)

A study of an Italian SME Guarantee program found a causal relationship between
utilization of a guarantee and an increase in the amount of debt held. The authors
conclude that total SME credit additionality was 12.4% (Zecchini and Ventura 2009).
This study is notable because the authors did not try to determine how many of the loans
were additional, but rather what the total amount of additional credit was due to the
guarantee. This method has many advantages because a large number of very small loans
cannot skew the figures. Furthermore, as many studies have pointed out, the borrower
may have been able to receive a smaller loan at the same terms, so therefore the entire
loan was not additional, just a portion of the loan.
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For example, in a study of the Malaysian Guarantee Corporation, no firms using the
guarantee were found to be 100% additional, as all could have obtained some level of
formal financing outside the guarantee. However, most would not have been able to
borrow the same amount under the same terms as they were able to with the guarantee.
Through detailed interviews with a sample of 15 borrowers that utilized the guarantees,
additionality was calculated at 37%. This figure is lower than what was reported through
a survey of a larger number of borrowers in Malaysia, again bringing into question the
understanding of borrowers regarding loans (Boocock and Shariff 2005).

Difficulties in Determining Additionality
As all of the studies point out, most borrowers can obtain at least some credit without the
guarantee. However, if the smaller amount available was not sufficient to meet the
investment needs of the business, for example, to buy new machinery, than the firm may
have decided not to take a loan at all. In these cases, since the loan would not have been
made without the guarantee, additionality could be viewed as 100% for these firms.
Boockock and Shariff (2005) attempt to measure this phenomenon be examining a panel
of 15 guarantee recipients. They determined that 8 of the 15 likely could not have
completed their investment plans without the guarantee. However, they point out that
since there is no way to be certain what borrowing decisions the firm would have made in
the absence of the guarantee, accurately measuring this figure is difficult.

Discrepancies between what borrowers state and what lenders state in surveys and
interviews demonstrates another difficulty in determining financial additionality, that is
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‗how certain is it that the loan could not have been obtained without a guarantee?‘ This
is particularly acute when surveys are the principal source of information, and also calls
into question how well informed borrowers are about their loans. The issue of difficulties
with surveys, particularly due to requiring recollection, and of the innate optimism of
entrepreneurs possibly coloring their responses, has been mentioned in the literature as
well (Riding 2009).

Several of the research articles have also highlighted either a lack of information by the
borrower, or a discrepancy between what the borrowers thought versus what the lender
stated. For example, in a survey of Palestinian SME‘s, 70% of respondents said they
were denied a loan due to lack of collateral, though bank credit officers in the same study
said that only between 27-42% of loans are rejected due to lack of collateral, a fairly
significant gap. While the authors do not explore the reasons for this discrepancy, they
did seek additional opinions from banks not included in the survey, and these confirmed
the bank officer‘s figures (Makhool et al. 2005). While there are a variety of possibilities
for this discrepancy, it seems likely that part of the reason is a lack of communication
between the borrower and the lender, or a lack of understanding by the borrower. This is
a similar result to the finding that over 50% of the participants in the Michigan Capital
Access Program did not know what program they were in, and 30% were not aware they
were paying extra fees or even participating in any sort of program at all (Hamlin 1998).
As further evidence of the borrower‘s lack of understanding, the author also pointed out
that many borrowers did not know what types of additional collateral they had pledged,
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saying they left such matters up to their accountants (though presumably the accountant
hadn‘t negotiated the loan contract).

As more evidence that surveys are difficult to rely on, a study for the Canadian Small
Business Financing Program surveyed approximately 1000 borrowers, half of whom had
received guaranteed loans in the last year, and asked each if they had applied for a loan in
the last 12 months; only 66% of the guaranteed borrowers group responded that they had
applied for a loan. While it may be possible that a portion of the borrowers actually had
applied for their loan over 12 months ago, but received it within the last 12 months
(which was how the group was selected), it seems unlikely that a full third would fall into
this category. The reason for this discrepancy is not explored; however, the authors point
out that it is consistent with a similar previous survey in which 18% of borrowers denied
having ever applied for a loan, when in fact they had received a guaranteed loan in the
recent past (Phoenix Strategic Perspectives 2007). It may be possible that the person
responding to the survey does not have full knowledge of the firm‘s operations, or, for
whatever reason, does not wish to disclose anything about their credit, or that they have
even received credit. Regardless of the reason, it should be a cause for concern to
researchers using interviews to base their studies upon.
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Chapter 6
Banking and SME‘s
Small and Medium Enterprises
Small and medium sized enterprises (SME‘s) are targeted by government interventions
worldwide to support their growth and development. The reasons for these interventions
are often quite similar, and generally revolve around two ideas, which are also the two
most commonly cited reasons for the existence of SME guarantee programs worldwide:

1) SME‘s are tremendous engines of job creation and thus have an extremely important
impact on the overall economy,

2) SME‘s tend to lack access to formal credit at a level commensurate with their
contribution to the economy.

There is strong evidence on both counts. Statistics generally tend to support the notion
that SME‘s, as a group, are extremely important to employment in an economy, whether
developed or developing. For example, in India, SME‘s produce 40% of manufacturing
output and 36% of direct exports (CGTSI 2003) and in Thailand, SME‘s are credited with
creating about 60% of total jobs in the country (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and
Vichyanond 2006), a figure very similar to the 50% they are credited with creating in the
United States (Headd 2010).
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While most data is positive, much of it is also inconclusive. For example, surveys across
45 countries found a strong, positive association between the importance of SMEs and
GDP per capita growth. The authors point out, however, that the data does not
confidently support the conclusions that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth. It may
in fact be the case that a growing economy creates better conditions for small businesses
to flourish, and not the other way around. Furthermore, the authors point out that they
find no evidence that SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality (Beck et al.
2005).

A British study examining entrepreneurship asked a random sample of workers, who had
previously indicated that they had considered becoming self-employed, why they had not
become entrepreneurs; the most common answer was a shortage of money or capital. A
separate British survey on entrepreneurship found that most small businesses were begun
with personal or family funds, rather than with a bank loan, indicating that personal or
family wealth was a major factor in starting a small business. Furthermore, the same
study found that most entrepreneurs felt they needed help with finance, and that the
biggest concern of potential entrepreneurs was obtaining capital. Finally, receipt of an
inheritance or a gift seems to increase a person‘s likelihood of becoming self employed
(Blancheflower and Oswald 1998).

Information Asymmetry and Credit Rationing of SME’s
On the topic of access to credit for SME‘s, there is a long body of literature examining
the phenomena of ―credit rationing‖, which occurs when a bank chooses not to loan out
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all available funds, although they have adequate opportunity to do so. In this scenario
credit is not equally available to all qualified borrowers. There are a variety of reasons
why this occurs, though in the case of SME borrowers, the prevailing reason is that banks
cannot adequately determine which borrowers are creditworthy, and choose to limit their
exposure. This is often referred to as information asymmetry, and means that one party
has access to more information than the other party. In this case, information asymmetry
refers to the fact that a lender has much less knowledge of the potential borrower‘s
likelihood of default than the borrower does.

The issue of information asymmetry is not unique to SME‘s, though it is likely more
pronounced than for large corporations that can provide more detailed information.
Furthermore, the age of the firm also greatly affects the information available, meaning
new and relatively young firms have less historical data to provide in support of their
loan application. Research has shown that the financial assessment of the business is the
most important factor in whether a loan is approved, regardless of whether a country is
developed or developing (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008).

Large companies can provide financial statements and a history of loan repayments that
the bank can use to determine their creditworthiness. Large companies can also typically
pledge collateral to mitigate the bank‘s losses in the event of a default, as well as to show
that the borrower has enough confidence in their business to risk property. However,
since many SME borrowers can provide neither financial statements nor collateral, banks
do not have enough information to judge creditworthiness and often sharply limit SME
loans.
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For instance, although a World Bank Survey of banks in 45 countries found that banks
perceive the SME segment to be highly profitable, regardless of the country‘s level of
development, they still limit their interactions with the sector. One of the principle
reasons is macroeconomic risk; banks feel small businesses are more sensitive to a
downturn than larger businesses. This is particularly true in developing countries, with
39% of developing country banks calling it a major obstacle versus only 9% of developed
country banks. Another prominent reason banks avoid SME lending is because they
tend to have much higher default rates (7.4% for small firms, 5.7% for medium firms)
than larger firms (4%) when averaged across all countries (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera
2008).

According to the aforementioned surveys, 45% of banks in developed countries cited
competition for SME clients as a major reason why they do not have more SME business,
while in developing countries, this figure was only 15% (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera
2008). This difference illustrates the vastly different circumstances facing SME‘s in a
developing country, versus those in the developed world. While it gives great credence
to the idea that SME‘s lack access to credit in the developing world, it calls into question
this same claim about SME‘s in the developed world.

While the barriers to accessing capital may be higher in developing countries, they do
still exist in developed countries as well. For example, increased and timely access to
capital was the most consistent and pronounced of the recommendations of at least 12
state and regional economic development studies in California, and 15 of the top 60

58
recommendations adopted at the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business
(Bradshaw 2002).

Differences in the banking systems in developed and developing countries also may play
a role in credit rationing. Developed countries often have more specialized lenders than
developing countries, with smaller community banks and credit unions that target SME
borrowers. These lenders may offer better rates and service than a larger bank (a
potential fault of the World Bank survey is that it only included large institutions, not
taking these smaller players into account). In developing countries, the banking sector is
often made up of a few large banks whose primary business is lending to the government
and large industries. While these banks may lend to individuals and smaller businesses,
this is usually a small fraction of their total business. Therefore, by offering guarantees
the bank‘s risk can be mitigated and they can be exposed to the SME market. The
expectation is that banks will learn about the SME market, view it as potentially lucrative
and expand their activities without need for guarantees.

While the notion of credit rationing is cited almost universally in the guarantee fund
literature, there are arguments against its validity. Most notably, De Rugy argues that
there is no failure by the private sector to allocate loans efficiently (De Rugy 2006). She
also argues that the very small share of the United States SME market covered by SBA
guarantees (less than 5%), serves to illustrate her point that almost all small businesses
are able to obtain conventional financing. Research on the UK Small Firms Loan
Guarantee Fund (SFLG) also finds little evidence of credit rationing (Cowling 2007).
However, the authors do point out that there is a pool of small firms, such as startups,
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who will always find it more difficult to raise funds due to information asymmetry from
the credit market, particularly when macroeconomic conditions are worsening, even if
collateral is available. A similar sentiment was expressed by a survey of SBA guaranteed
lenders which found that most banks considered SBA loans to be a small fraction of their
business, but felt they were important for increasing the share of lending to particular
market niches, such as startups and businesses within certain industries (Temken and
Theodos 2008). This seems to suggest that guaranteed loans, particularly in developed
countries may be better used to target a particular group of underserved borrowers, rather
than SME‘s as a whole.

While the extent of the credit rationing phenomenon may be debated, it nonetheless is
often cited as a key reason for the existence of SME guarantee funds. An economy is
not reaching its full potential if investment plans that can increase employment growth
and profitability are denied credit. Interventions, such as guarantees, can allow
creditworthy small businesses to access the formal loan market and contribute to
economic growth. This seems particularly true in developing countries that often have a
limited banking sector and where macroeconomic risk and information asymmetry are
major obstacles to SME lending.

Lack of Collateral
One of the most common reasons given for SME‘s inability to access credit is that they
cannot provide collateral. In many cases, and as noted previously, this directly relates to
the personal wealth of the borrower. In a survey of Palestinian SME‘s, 70% of
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respondents claimed their loan application was rejected due to lack of collateral, and
100% of the respondents who had been approved for a loan but did not take it cited the
onerous collateral requirements (Makhool et al. 2005).

Collateral serves to lessen the risk to the lender in the event of a default, and is a typical
requirement of SME borrowers, with small firms tending to be required to pledge more
collateral than larger firms (Pozzolo 2004). Though a survey of SME lenders found that
collateral trailed far behind the financial assessment of the firm in terms of importance
for loan approval, 90% of the banks in the survey indicated that they required collateral
of SME borrowers (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008). Therefore, a business that
passed the first test of the financial assessment may still be denied the loan due to lack of
collateral (but a firm with full collateral would likely not get a loan if they had a poor
financial assessment). The same survey found that developing countries actually tend to
use less collateral than developed countries (likely due to poor property registration), but
not in greatly different amounts.

Due to a variety of factors collateral is often unavailable for a SME borrower to pledge.
For example, a credit worthy small businesses may be a startup, or may simply not have
enough assets to pledge. Furthermore, many developing countries lack reliable property
registration systems, such that even if a borrower has assets, they may have no clear title
to pledge, thus effectively barring them from the credit market.

Hanson, (as cited by Cowling), expresses the point in the following way:
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Entrepreneurial talent is not the prerogative of the wealthy, but is
broadly distributed throughout the population as a whole. Without
reasonable access to financing, many of our countries‘ most talented
and aggressive entrepreneurs will be cut out of the economic system.
Innovation and business development will become a luxury reserved
for the wealthy, and the economy as a whole will suffer. (Cowling,
2007 Pg. 4)

Further evidence to show that borrower wealth directly relates to access to credit is
presented in a study o f the UK‘s Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme, in which regions
which had rising home values had lower rates of loan guarantee usage, presumably
because borrowers were able to obtain conventional loans using their personal property as
collateral (Cowling 1998).

This lack of collateral by otherwise credit worthy borrowers is often the justification for
intervention in the credit markets through guarantee schemes (Park 1995; Bulgaria
National Guarantee Fund 2010). Research has also shown that as firms build longer and
better relationships with banks, collateral needs are lessened (Cowling 1999). However,
beginning these relationships is often very difficult for small firms, new firms, and poorer
firms, thus the opportunity to start a banking relationship through a guarantee can be very
valuable.
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Transaction Costs and Adverse Selection
Another often cited reason for why banks do not lend to SME‘s is the higher transaction
costs involved relative to the size of the loan (Davies 2007). Making many small loans
is much more costly than providing a smaller number of large loans. To overcome this
cost, banks may charge a premium to smaller borrowers. However, research has shown
that an increase in the cost of capital can raise the default rate (Cowling and Mitchell
2003). Defaults may increase because the higher rates are onerous to the borrower, or, if
the rate becomes too high, borrowers may feel the need to use the funds in high risk/high
return projects to repay the debt.

Adverse selection occurs when the terms offered by a loan will primarily attract riskier
borrowers, and thus a bank will tend to only have risky borrowers to choose from. For
example, if a bank only offers loans at a relatively high rate, safe borrowers that can
obtain funding at a lower cost elsewhere will choose to do so. This will leave the bank
with only applicants that have high risk/high reward projects and are more willing to pay
a higher rate. Therefore, if a bank charges SME borrowers a considerably higher rate to
compensate for their riskiness, the bank may only attract risky borrowers. Higher costs
of borrowing are directly related to higher default rates, and while this may partly be due
to the higher costs of servicing the debt, this is also seen as evidence of adverse selection
at work (Cowling and Mitchell 2003).

This issue is also important for the pricing of guarantee fund fees. The fund must charge
a high enough fee to cover its costs and maintain its loss reserve. However, if it charges
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too high of a fee, safer borrowers will either be able to find funding at lower costs
elsewhere without the guarantee, or they may forego the loan entirely because it is too
costly. This will only leave the guarantee fund with high risk projects to support, and
because these will likely have a higher default rate, the fund may be unsustainable.
Therefore, charging high rates to mitigate default risks may actually increase the default
rates, creating a vicious circle that leads to the fund‘s demise.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Recommendations
Small and medium sized businesses are recognized worldwide as being engines of job
creation and vitally important for promoting economic growth. A key limiting factor for
SME‘s though is access to credit. To alleviate this constraint, over 100 countries have
established guarantee funds to help enable creditworthy SMEs to obtain loans. While the
programs are widespread, their effectiveness has received relatively little study, and
opinions are mixed regarding their overall benefits. One reason for the mixed results
may be that a guarantee fund‘s structure is not well suited for the particular situation in
which it operates.

This research has attempted to answer the question of whether the economic environment
and particular economic development goals of a country should be taken into account
when choosing the structure of a guarantee fund. The weight of the research does show
that different structures do affect how well a fund can target guarantee recipients, as well
as how efficiently the fund‘s resources are used. Therefore, policy makers should utilize
a deliberative process whereby they use their particular circumstances and goals to
choose the structure that suits them best, rather than simply following the prevailing
trends. To aid in this process, comparison tables have been created through this research
to serve as a guide in comparing different structures.
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Analysis
To date, guarantee funds in developed and less developed countries have generally been
structured in different ways, based primarily on the perceived lower level of interest in
small business lending by LDC banks, as well as their loan assessment ability. Retail
funds that require more oversight, have stricter borrower limitations and perform costly
independent loan appraisals seem to be more prevalent in less developed countries.
Portfolio funds that offer broader eligibility, limited loan appraisals and allow more
independence for banks tend to be located in developed countries, and more funds in
developed countries seem to be shifting to this model. The justification for this is that
developing country banks may not have the expertise necessary to deal with the SME
market, they may not be interested in the SME market, and the risk of exploitation is
greater, thus necessitating the extra involvement by the retail guarantee fund. Developed
country banks, in contrast, are considered to have higher interest in the SME market, as
well as better knowledge and procedures, and thus can be trusted to make loan decisions
independently.

While these assumptions may be true, they do not seem to take the economic
development goals of the guarantee fund programs into account. In most developed
countries, guarantees only support a small portion of SME loans, usually from 5-10%,
and many of these borrowers may well have been able to get some level of credit without
the guarantee anyway. Furthermore, the most commonly cited reason for getting a
guarantee is too extend the maturity of the loan in order to lower payments, rather than
substitute for missing collateral. This raises questions of the government essentially
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subsidizing businesses and creating unfair competition for similar companies that did not
get a guarantee and had to make higher payments. There may be justification for this if
the program was targeting specific groups of borrowers that could support economic
development goals, but almost universally, guarantee funds have been moving toward
broader eligibility. If the main effect of a guarantee fund is to increase loan maturity, it
seems that this should be broken out as a separate benefit and made more widely
available to all SMEs. As this could lower expenses quite dramatically for the SME
sector, and likely at little cost to the government, it could have a big boost on the national
economy.

The argument that developing country banks are not in a position to adequately assess the
creditworthiness of SMEs may be accurate in many cases. However, if this is the case,
then a guarantee fund would be quite valuable in the initial stages of operation, but
should decline over time as banks gain more knowledge of the SME market. This is a
hard point to judge, but there does not seem to be any evidence of guarantee funds
shutting down due to banks not needing their services anymore. It seems likely that
banks probably do benefit from the exposure to the SME market, but due to the nature of
the borrowers, they are still not willing to lend to many due to a lack of collateral. If this
is true and banks can adequately appraise SME borrowers, but collateral is the binding
constraint, then developing countries would be better served to move to portfolio models
in order to lower costs and improve sustainability.

This would also ease any

unconscious bias the guarantee fund‘s independent appraisal may have. While this is not
a topic that has garnered much attention in the literature, it seems that it could be a risk,
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particularly in countries with sharp ethnic or religious divides, or even if the guarantee
fund officers are simply more comfortable approving loans to one industry or region but
not another.

Therefore, the prevailing system may benefit from being shifted 180 degrees. Developed
countries may not be getting significant benefits from their scattershot approach and
would be better served by highly targeting their resources toward specific economic
development goals. On the other hand, developing countries that have a sufficiently
capable banking system likely would benefit from lowering costs and administrative
burdens in order to more widely support SMEs.

Where capital access programs fit into this equation is a little more difficult to determine.
It is somewhat surprising that they have not expanded beyond the United States, but as
SMEs will continue to remain a policy priority worldwide, it seems possible that they
may begin to spread soon. It would seem likely that developed countries would be the
first to adopt a CAP scheme, as their banks have the most capacity to judge SME
borrowers. Furthermore, at some point it would not be surprising to see a developed
country shift its guarantee fund operations into a capital access program. Not only would
it lower administrative overhead, but it would also remove a large potential liability from
the government.

Capital access programs may have a place in developing countries as well though.
Certainly their low risk structure should appeal greatly to developing countries that fear
taking on an inordinate amount of risk, and their low administrative costs make initiating
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a program relatively simple. Convincing policy makers to commit continuing support
may be the biggest difficulty, but as the figures are relatively small on a national budget
basis, this may not be a high hurdle. The initial funding would need to be higher than
future funding in order to attract banks and help to accelerate the growth of their loan loss
reserves, but this may be accomplished through foreign aid or grants that provide funds
targeting support for SMEs.

Another consideration for developed countries is if guarantee funds are the best tool to
accomplish economic development goals, particularly when not highly targeted. A
World Bank survey of SME lenders worldwide found that in developed countries,
competition for SME loans was the main reason banks cited for not making more SME
loans (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008). If, in fact, competition is the main obstacle to
banks offering SME loans in developed countries, rather than risk, than it seems possible
that banks simply don‘t view it as profitable enough to pursue, regardless of how safe the
loans are. This makes sense, as smaller loans are always going to be more expensive to
service, regardless of their default ratio. To make them profitable, banks would have to
charge higher interest rates, which the SME borrowers may view as too high (or would
only attract risky borrowers causing a high default rate). Perhaps addressing this through
interest rate subsidies or other pricing mechanisms, rather than guarantees, would be
more effective in increasing the amount of SME credit.
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Tools for Choosing a Guarantee Fund Structure
There are a wide array of guarantee fund structures, and no one structure can be
considered the best. Each structure has different variables, and finding the right
combination of these variables to fit a particular economy can greatly improve the
outcomes the guarantee fund will produce. Policymakers may be well served to ask and
answer the following questions when choosing a guarantee fund structure.

1. What is the level of engagement of local banks with SMEs, and what is their
ability level in regards to assessing SME loans? This answer will strongly
determine whether secondary assessments are used, and how much support banks
will require.

2. Are we seeking to help a specific group of borrowers or all SMEs through the
guarantee fund? This answer will strongly determine what method of targeting is
used.

3. What level of risk is the government willing to accept? This answer can give
policy makers another dimension to compare structures by, instead of simply
choosing based on perceived benefits.

After answering these questions, policymakers can use the results to find a guarantee
fund structure that will best fit their particular situation. The following table may be
helpful in that regard. The table provides descriptions of the most common structures, as
well as several indicators that will closely correspond to the questions above.

Partner banks begin by having all loans go through a
secondary assessment. May graduate to portfolio
program if criteria is met to show bank has adequate
assessment skills. Secondary assessment may also
be used for all loans over a certain size.

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Only open to SMEs that
meet eligibility requirements. Borrowers may be
targeted by demographics of business owner, industry,
or by specific geographic areas.

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Open to all SMEs, but with
incentives for bank’s to include targeted groups, such
as women business owners, or businesses located in
under served areas, such as rural or inner city.

Medium

Fast

Fast

Fast

Fast

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Only open to SMEs that
meet eligibility requirements. Borrowers may be
targeted by demographics of business owner, industry,
or by specific geographic areas.

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Open to all SMEs.

Fast

Fast

Slow

Slow

Slow

Slow

Average
Speed of
Approval

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Open to all SMEs, but with
incentives for bank’s to include targeted groups, such
as women business owners, or businesses located in
under served areas, such as rural or inner city.

Banks screen applicants for eligibility and choose
which applicants to enroll. Open to all SMEs.

Provides highly specialized expertise to evaluate
applications or business plans that banks are unable to
evaluate due to lack of expertise.

Provides a secondary assessment to support bank’s
assessment. Only open to SMEs that meet eligibility
requirements. Borrowers may be targeted by
demographics of business owner, industry, or by
specific geographic areas.

Provides a secondary assessment to support bank’s
assessment. Open to all SMEs, but with incentives for
bank’s to include targeted groups, such as women
business owners, or businesses located in under
served areas, such as rural or inner city.

Provides a secondary assessment to support bank’s
assessment. Open to all SMEs.

Description

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

High

High

High

Operational
Costs

Medium

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

High

Medium

Low

Level of
Targeting

Medium

High

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Default Risk

Promoting broad economic development, while providing support for banks to
encourage interaction with SMEs. Taking advantage of bank’s expertise,
while lowering risk by performing secondary assessments on large loans.

Promoting broad economic development, while taking advantage of banks
expertise, but with special emphasis on under served borrowers, such as
minorities, or rural businesses. Reducing long term budget risk by limiting
liability to allocated funds.

Promoting broad economic development, while taking advantage of banks
expertise, but with special emphasis on under served borrowers, such as
minorities, or rural businesses. Reducing long term budget risk by limiting
liability to allocated funds.

Promoting broad economic development, while taking advantage of banks
expertise. Reducing long term budget risk by limiting liability to allocated
funds.

Promoting economic development of targeted groups of borrowers, or of
targeted geographic areas, while taking advantage of bank’s expertise.

Promoting broad economic development, while taking advantage of banks
expertise

Promoting broad economic development, while taking advantage of banks
expertise, but with special emphasis on under served borrowers, such as
minorities, or rural businesses.

Promoting the development of industries or regions that are deemed
economically important, but are under served by banks because they lack the
expertise to make assessments. Examples may be technology or agriculture,
but could be any industry that the govt. wants to support, but is difficult for
banks to assess.

Promoting economic development of targeted groups of borrowers, or of
targeted geographic areas. Provide support for banks to encourage
interaction with SMEs & the under served. The secondary assessment may
not be highly specialized, but will often have added experience with target
groups to better screen applicants.

Promoting broad economic development, but with special emphasis on under
served borrowers, such as minorities, or rural businesses. Provide support
for banks to encourage interaction with SMEs & the under served. The
secondary assessment does not have to be specialized in these targeted
areas, but will often have added experience to better screen applicants.

Promoting broad economic development, while providing support for banks to
encourage interaction with SMEs.

Development Goals

Notes:
Structure: While most funds utilize incentives, the strength of these incentives vary widely. Therefore, for comparison purposes, a fund whose incentives are not actively utilized can be considered similar to one
that does not have
incentives. Any structure could also restrict eligibility to only certain groups of borrowers, thus being highly targeted, but this is rare due to the need for a large pool of borrowers to diversify risk.
Average Speed of Approval: Based on typical procedures required for approval
Operational Costs: Includes office overhead, staff, customer service, and loan collection requirements. Does not include guarantee capital.
Level of Targeting: The degree to which a fund can deliver benefits to specific groups of borrowers deemed important for economic development
Default Risk: Due to the variety of factors that can affect defaults, and the limited data available, this measure is not empirically derived. Instead it is based on both the level of loan oversight & assessment, as well as how
diversified the borrower pool is.

Combination
Secondary
Assessment &
Portfolio

Eligibility Restricted
to Targeted Borrowers

CAP

General Purpose w/
Targeted Incentives

CAP

General Purpose

CAP

Eligibility restricted to
Targeted borrowers

Portfolio

General Purpose w/
Targeted Incentives

Portfolio

General Purpose

Portfolio

Highly Targeted
Specialized Assessment

Secondary
Assessment

Eligibility restricted to
Targeted borrowers

Secondary
Assessment

General Purpose w/
Targeted Incentives

Secondary
Assessment

General purpose

Secondary
Assessment

Structure
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Conclusion
The use of guarantee funds to promote SME development through credit access is
unlikely to abate. While many of these programs operate in relative obscurity, only
getting attention when politicians wish to tout their support for small business, they still
play an important economic development role. However, whether this role is mostly
positive, in that they are helping good businesses to grow, or negative, in that they are
supporting struggling businesses that ultimately stifle innovation and may actually force
out other businesses, is somewhat of an open question. In any case, companies all over
the world are currently receiving loans thanks to guarantee funds, and as such, policy
makers should consider if the companies receiving the guarantees, and the way in which
they are awarded is best promoting their economic development goals.

In order to determine how well different guarantee fund structures are tailored to meet
specific development goals however, better tools for measuring their effectiveness need
to be developed. The most common metrics currently, default rate, economic
additionality, and financial additionality can tell a great deal about a guarantee fund;
however, because there is no consistent standard of measurement for any of these
metrics, accurate comparisons are impossible. Creating an internationally accepted series
of standards would not only allow for better comparisons, but with the standards set forth,
GF‘s could better target their data collection. These standards could be constructed by an
international organization with an interest in GF‘s, such as the World Bank, or by an
association of GF‘s, such as the AECM, which represents 34 GF‘s in Europe.
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Guarantee funds are currently used by many less developed countries and can be
important partners in microfinance development efforts. Most notably, guarantee funds
can serve as a bridge for borrowers between microfinance and conventional finance.
Most microfinance efforts revolve around very small loans made by specialized
microfinance institutions (MFI‘s) to individual entrepreneurs. These borrowers would
typically not be considered by a conventional bank due to the size of the loan and the lack
of credit history. However, as the entrepreneur‘s business grows and expands, they may
outgrow the capabilities of the MFI, but they don‘t yet qualify for a conventional bank
loan. In this case, a guarantee is the ideal tool to transition a successful entrepreneur
from microfinance to conventional finance. A GF and an MFI can also be valuable
partners for each other. The GF will often have information about the small business
environment that can be very valuable for microfinance recipients, and may also be able
to encourage business relationships between the MFI and GF borrowers. The MFI can
also provide the GF valuable information about the credit worthiness of a borrower, as
well as their business prospects, based on the MFI‘s past experience with the borrower.

In conclusion, guarantee funds have been shown to have a positive impact on both
employment and economic growth, particularly in low income areas and less developed
countries. While the degree of this impact, as well as the cost, is still being debated,
guarantee funds have proven to be an important tool for helping entrepreneurs start and
grow businesses all over the world. However, it does not appear that most guarantee
funds have reached their full potential for increasing job creation or promoting
competition and innovation. To accomplish this, better tools for measuring the
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effectiveness of guarantee funds must be developed and policy makers must begin to
more tightly tie the operation of their guarantee fund to their particular economic
development situation and their economic development goals.

Areas for further study
There are a multitude of topics for further research into guarantee funds. On a general
basis, there is no ongoing effort to track guarantee funds or to create comparable
measures with which to compare them by. Furthermore, there are a significant lack of
case studies regarding guarantee funds, particularly any that include details of their
inception, funding (initial and ongoing), and operations, so that more accurate
assessments of them can be made. This is particularly true for many smaller programs
and those in developing countries, since many do not provide any information in English,
making research on them difficult, even with the aid of services such as Google
Translate. Case studies detailing the history of the program, how it is funded and
operates, who its primary beneficiaries are, as well as any insights into strengths and
weaknesses would be highly valuable.

While several studies mention a distinction between the type of credit guaranteed
(startup, expansion, working capital, etc…), there is very little discussion of which is the
most advantageous. Knowing what type of credit to guarantee to promote various kinds
of economic development would seem to be invaluable information.
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Many states offer higher match multiples in their CAPs for specific borrowers. However,
it is unclear how this affects banks willingness to make these loans. While in the early
stages of participation, a bank may by highly attracted to more quickly building its loss
reserve and make a more risky loan, but once the reserve reaches a certain level, that
same attraction may not exist. If the extra match does not encourage banks to make these
loans, than that portion of the program should be reconsidered to find better incentives
for the bank.
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